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Sense, Existence and Justice, 
or, How to Live in a Secular World?
Abstract
It has been taken for granted that in western modernity we are dealing with a secularised 
world, an atheistic world where religion is no longer reigning the public sphere. In other 
words: a world where sense lies outside the world towards a world where sense is situated 
within it. If we follow the line of thought French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy sets out in his 
books The	Sense	of	the	World	and	Dis-Enclosure, we have to think world not as what has 
its sense within itself, but as what is sense itself. To live in a secular world, means to live 
in a world which is sense, a world that has become responsible for itself but never closes 
in itself. Nancy, thereby inspired by Martin Heidegger, claims that in a secularised world 
it is no longer a question of whether the world has sense, but that the world is sense. If we 
want to be atheists today, Nancy concludes, we no longer have to do with the question, “why 
is there something in general?” but with the answer, “there is something, and that alone 
makes sense.
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“The	generalized	secularization	of	the	West	is	an	in-
disputable	 fact.	 However,	 the	 evocation	 of	 this	 fact	
does not resolve the philosophical issue.”
Bernard Flynn1
1. The world from a secular perspective
From	a	Christian	perspective	the	world	is	a	place	whose	sense	lies	beyond	it:	a	
position	Wittgenstein	also	seems	to	share	in	his	famous	expression	6.41	of	his	
Tractatus logico-philosophicus:	“The	sense	of	the	world	must	lie	outside	the	
world”.2	If	secularization	is	our	perspective,	the	most	logical	option	seems	to	
lie	in	a	mere	immanentisation	of	this	other-worldly	sense.	If	this	logic	would	
still	 make	 up	 the	 thought	 of	 Jean-Luc	Nancy	 in	Dis-Enclosure,	 its	 stance	
would	be	highly	repetitive:	are	we	not	saying	this	for	centuries	now?
1
Bernard	 Flynn,	 The Philosophy of Claude 
Lefort: Interpreting the Political,	 Evanston	
Ill:	Northwestern	University	Press,	2005,	pp.	
112–113.
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Ludwig	 Wittgenstein,	 Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus,	 transl.	 D.	 F.	 Pears	 and	 B.	 F.	
McGuinness;	 with	 an	 introduction	 by	 Ber-
trand	Russell,	London:	Routledge,	2001.
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 
49	(1/2010)	pp.	(149–160)
I.	Devisch,	K.	Vandeputte,	Sense,	Existence	
and	Justice,	or,	How	to	Live	in	a	Secular	…150
Although	we	do	not	have	many	alternatives	at	our	disposal	in	present	thought,	
Nancy	tries	to	tell	us	something	different:	unless	we	want	to	inhabit	a	negative	
version	of	Christian	thought,	we	must	look	at	sense	in	a	completely	different	
way,	if	we	want	to	live	in	a	secularized	world,	if	we	want	to	be	“atheists”.
For	this	reason,	Nancy	dialogues	with	Wittgenstein	in	The Sense of the World,	
if only very briefly.3	Sense	is	not	so	much	something	that	we	“the	secular-
ized”,	as	the	successors	of	God,	now	confer	upon	the	world	ourselves.	If	so,	
one	would	merely	 confirm	 the	Christian	 idea	 that	 the	world	 represents	 an	
absence	of	sense	or	an	object	whose	sense	is	given	from	the	outside	by	one	or	
the	other	subject.	What	remains	as	our	horizon	is	the	world	and	nothing	but	
the	world.	Sense	is	thus	nothing	other	than	co-existence	itself.	Being	secular-
ized	is	to	be	radically	exposed	to	sense,	to	the	world	as	such.	At	no	moment	
is	the	meaning	of	the	world	given	by	a	Creator.	But	if	there	is	only	this	world,	
and	it	is	no	longer	founded	in	and	through	otherworldliness,	does	Nancy	not	
seem	to	confirm	the	classical	thesis	of	secularization?	Where,	for	a	religious-
ly-founded	world,	the	sense	of	the	world	would	lie	in	an	instance	beyond	the	
world	or	acquire	an	otherworldly	status,	in	a	secular	world,	sense	would	be	
located	purely	immanently	in	the	world.	
It is precisely this idea that nancy questions and nuances. An interesting angle 
for	discussion	of	how	Nancy	proceeds	is	his	relation	to	Wittgenstein’s	already	
mentioned	claim	that	the	sense	of	the	world	must	lie	outside	the	world.	Witt-
genstein,	as	is	well-known,	regards	the	world	as	a	given	facticity	as	a	plain	
and	simple	state	of	affairs.	To	this	world,	sense	can	be	granted	from	outside	it.	
But	this	“place”	“outside	the	world”	is	thus	also	a	place	outside	the	totality	of	
all	places,	a	place	without	place	as	it	were.	The	question	then	is	how	we	can	
think	such	an	outside	nowadays?	According	to	Nancy,	Wittgenstein’s	“outside	
the	world”	in	this	way	still	partially	operates	as	the	continuation	of	a	Christian	
concept	of	the	world	whose	sense	lies	outside	itself.4	If	we	want	to	account	for	
the	“world	as	such”	we	must	approach	it	from	another	direction:
“As	 long	as	we	do	not	 take	 into	account,	without	 reserve,	 the	worldly	as	such,	we	have	not	
gotten	rid	of	demiurges	and	creators.	In	other	words,	we	are	not	yet	atheists.	Being	an	atheist	
is no longer a matter of denying a divine instance that has reabsorbed itself into itself (and this 
can	perhaps	therefore	no	longer	be	called	‘atheism’).	It	is	a	matter	of	opening	the	sense	of	the	
world.”5
In	 other	words,	Nancy	 appeals	 for	 a	 rather	Heideggerian	move:	 if	we	 are	
always	“thrown”	into	sense	and	that	sense	places	us	in	being-open(ed)-to,	in	
a	being-towards,	then	sense	is	always	being-towards	and	it	is	this	that	con-
stitutes	co-existence,	being	towards	the	world	as	such.	Any	comprehension	
or understanding of  sense  thus already  takes place  from out of  the opened 
horizon	that	the	world	is	for	us	and	to	which	we	are	always	already	exposed.	
That	the	world	is	–	the	global	spacing	or	taking	place	as	such	–	this	is	what	
sense	is	for	Nancy:
“As	 soon	 as	 the	 appearance	 of	 a	 beyond	 of	 the	world	 has	 been	 dissipated,	 the	 out-of-place	
instance	of	sense	opens	itself	up	within	the	world	to	the	extent	that	it	would	still	make	sense	
to	speak	of	a	‘within’.	Sense	belongs	to	the	structure	of	the	world,	hollows	out	therein	what	it	
would	be	necessary	to	name	better	than	by	calling	it	the	‘transcendence’	of	its	‘immanence’	–	its 
transimmanence,	or	more	simply	and	strongly,	its	existence	and	exposition.”6
That	there	is	something,	means	that	the	world	arises.	The	origin	of	the	world,	
Nancy	claims	at	several	places	in	his	work,	takes	place	everywhere,	over	and	
over	again	in	every	singular	act	of	sense,	always	momentary	and	local.	World 
is	always	a	plurality	of	worlds,	an	infinite	passage	of	phenomena.	The	world	
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is	structured	as	being-towards,	as	a	relation	–	in	all	possible	connotations	of	
the	word.	The	 “plural	 singular	 origin”	of	 the	world	 is	what	 comprises	 our	
co-existence.	It	is	the	naked	structure	of	our	“we-ness”	in	a	world	that	is	noth-
ing	but	world.	As	the	“trans-immanent”	structure	of	sense,	such	an	origin	of	
the	world	lies	not	outside	the	world,	but	each	and	every	arising	of	the	world	
takes	place	as	exposure,	as	transcendence	in	the	world.	Ultimately	the	sense	
of	the	world	is	thus	a	tautology.	The	world	is	structured	as	sense,	and	sense	is	
structured	as	world:
“If	we	are	toward	the	world,	 if	 there	is	being-toward-the-world	in	general,	 that	 is,	 if	 there	is	
world,	there	is	sense.	The	there	is	makes	sense	by	itself	and	as	such.	We	no	longer	have	to	do	
with	the	question,	‘why	is	there	something	in	general?’	but	with	the	answer,	‘there	is	something,	
and	that	alone	makes	sense’.”7
The	world	is	the	name	for	the	sense	of	the	“there	is”.	If	the	world	is,	and	if	
existence	no	longer	has	sense	but	is	sense,	than	there	is	no	senselessness	in	
this	name,	and	man	cannot	declare	its	existence	null	and	void.	Nihilism	and	
idealism sublate one another at this point.8	The	bankruptcy	of	the	concept	of	
the	world	as	deriving	from	a	first	cause	or	an	Idea	thus	does	not	cast	us	into	an	
abyssal	or	rudderless	world.	It	is	not	because	the	world	no	longer	permits	it-
self	to	be	represented	in	a	sense-bestowing	totality	that	existence	has	become	
senseless or abyssal.
The	world	seen	from	a	secular	perspective	can	only	be	sense	(and	vice versa) 
if	it	has	no	sense	(to	lose).	Sense	is	there	just	like	the	world	is	there:	without	
any	questioning	why.	Sense	stands	for	existence	itself,	for	the	fact	that	I	am	
opened	to	existence	and	to	the	world.	That	we	are	sense,	that	there	is	sense	
and	that	we	are	here,	this	is	the	radical	demand	and	consequence	of	the	opened	
space	that	the	global	world	has	become	for	us.	Being	in	the	world	comprises	
the	sense	of	our	existence.	To	the	extent	that	the	world	stands	in	relation	to	a	
creator	outside	the	world,	a	God	or	a	Subject,	it	can	have	sense.	If	want	to	live	
in	a	secular	world,	this	(relation	with	a)	creator	has	to	fall	away.	The	world	
then	no	longer	has	sense:	it	is	sense.	This	is	why	Nancy	can	write:
“If	 the	world	is	not	 the	work	of	a	God,	 this	 is	not	because	there	is	no	God,	as	 if	 this	were	an	
annoying	circumstance,	a	privative	condition	to	which	one	had	to	accommodate	oneself	as	best	
one	could.	(As	if,	in	the	final	analysis,	the	world	were	not	complete,	as	if	the	causal	or	final	part	
of	the	totality	had	been	simply	amputated.	Often,	atheism	has	not	known	how	to	communicate	
anything	other	than	this.)	But	there	is	no	God	because	there	is	the	world,	and	because	the	world	is	
neither	a	work	nor	an	operation	but	the	space	of	the	‘there	is’,	its	configuration	without	a	face.”9
2. The incommensurable
“There	is	no	God	because	there	is	the	world.”	But	if	there	is	the	world,	the	
question	is:	how	to	understand	it?	More	exactly:	how	to	think	the	secularized	
world	we	live	in?	Let	us	quote	from	the	“Opening”	in	Dis-Enclosure:
3
Jean-Luc	 Nancy,	 The Sense of the World,	
Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	
1998.
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Ibid.,	p.	55.
5
Ibid.,	p.	158.
6
Ibid.,	p.	55.
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Ibid.,	p.	7.
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Ibid.,	p.	79.
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Ibid.,	p.	156.
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“The	West	was	born	not	from	the	liquidation	of	a	dark	world	of	beliefs,	dissolved	by	the	light	
of	a	new	sun	–	and	this	no	more	so	in	Greece	than	during	the	Renaissance	or	the	eighteenth	
century.	 It	 took	 shape	 in	a	metamorphosis	of	 the	overall	 relation	 to	 the	world,	 such	 that	 the	
“inaccessible”	in	effect	took	shape	and	functioned,	as	it	were,	precisely as such	in	thought,	in	
knowledge,	and	in	behavior.	There	was	no	reduction	of	the	unknown,	but	rather	an	aggravation	
of	the	incommensurable	(which	was	no	accident,	if	the	solution	to	the	mathematical	problem	of	
“incommensurables”	–	the	alogon	that	is	the	diagonal	of	the	square	–	furnished	the	emblematic	
figure	of	the	birth	of	true	knowledge	and,	with	it	or	in	it,	the	modelling	or	mathematical	regu-
lation of philosophy).”10
The	sentence	which	fascinates	us	particularly	in	this	quote	is	“that	there	was	
no	 reduction	of	 the	unknown,	but	 rather	 an	 aggravation	of	 the	 incommen-
surable”.	 It	 fascinates	 us,	 not	 only	 because	 of	 its	 content	 and	 its	 presence	
in	other	texts	of	Nancy’s	oeuvre,	but	also	because	it	relates	the	problem	of	
secularization,	 including	 sense  and world,	 to	 that	 of	 justice.	This	 relation-
ship	may	surprise	the	non-Nancy	scholar,	but	for	Nancy,	justice	is	first	and	
for	all	connected	with	the	fact	of	our	co-existence,	with	what	is	unique	about	
every	existence	in	its	co-existence	with	other	creations.	He	addresses	juridi-
cal	issues	as	religious	problems,	or	the	other	way	round,	issues	such	as:	the	
day	of	judgement,	being	judged	and	judging,	being	summoned,	the	law,	the	
covenant,	right	and	justice	or	being	responsible.	Nancy	treats	these	issues	in	a	
way	that	enables	him	to	demonstrate	their	“religious”	origin.
In	a	small	 text	called	“Cosmos	Basileus”,	 included	 in	Being Singular Plu-
ral, nancy discusses this topic by means of a reflection on the unity of the 
world.11	He	states	that	the	unity	of	the	world	is	nothing	other	than	the	diversi-
ty	and,	hence,	the	world’s	non-unity.	A	world	is	always	a	plurality	of	worlds.	
Existing	begins	with	 the	exposure	 to	plurality	 and	 to	 sharing.	The	 sharing	
of	the	world	or	co-existence	is	according	to	Nancy	thus	also	the	“law	of	the	
world”.	The	world	has	no	other	law	than	this;	it	is	not	subject	to	a	sovereign	
authority.	The	world	 always	means	 co-existing,	 being	 shared	 and	 divided,	
and	is	never	a	unity	or	a	totality.	Therefore	the	law	of	the	world	cannot	be	
equated	with	the	accomplishment	of	one	or	the	other	unity	or	totality.	On	the	
contrary,	already	in	the	opening	sentences	of	the	essay,	Nancy	describes	the	
nomos	of	the	world	as	the	dissemination,	the	division	and	the	allocation	of	
sharing of everything.
Nancy’s	elaboration	of	this	is	just	as	brief	as	the	description	of	it.	Things	to	
be	disseminated	can	be	places	we	live	in,	but	just	as	well	portions	of	food	or	
rights	and	duties.	To	the	question	of	the	just	measure	(of	such	a	distribution),	
Nancy	answers	that	the	measure	of	covenant,	of	law	or	of	absolute	justice	lies	
nowhere	other	than	in	this	sharing	itself,	and	in	the	exceptional	singularity	of	
everyone	with	everyone	offered	by	this	sharing.	This	means,	according	to	our	
interpretation:	because	the	world	is	not	given	once	and	for	all,	because	there	
is	no	God	which	offers	the	Measure	of	the	world,	there	is	no	perfect	divide	
through	which	everyone	would	be	assigned	a	fixed	place.	On	the	contrary,	be-
cause	the	world	arises	in	and	through	the	taking	place	of	every	singular	plural	
appearance,	its	division	and	its	divide	are	at	stake	time	and	time	again,	that	is	
within	every	one	of	us,	with	every	appearance,	and	each	time	something	or	
someone	appears.	Sharing	or	division	is	 thus	precisely	that	which	connects	
the	theme	of	the	world	or	existence	and	that	of	justice.	In	this	way,	the	cov-
enant	is	also	nothing	other	than	co-existence.	Co-existence	is	not	something	
added	to	existence,	as	a	phenomenon	in	itself.	Co-existence	is	existence	ex-
isting as dividing-sharing.	As	a	consequence,	justice	means	doing	justice	to	
what	belongs	to	every	unique,	singular	creation	in	its	coexistence	with	other 
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creations. Justice is not primarily a matter of a singularity and only secondarily the 
relation	of	this	singularity	to	others.	That	which	makes	the	singular unique is 
at once	that	which	puts	it	into	relation.	To	do	justice	to	the	singular	absolute-
ness	of	one’s	proper	being	is	thus	simultaneously	to	do	justice	to	the	plurality	
of the singular.
To	do	justice	does	not	mean	we	can	dream	of	a	world	without	injustice.	In	a	
world	that	tries	to	think	itself	as	secular,	there	is	no	answer	to	the	question	
why	there	would	be	injustice.	The	theological	instances	explaining	or	justify-
ing	this	have	disappeared.	Justice	no	longer	enters	from	outside	the	world	to	
recuperate	the	world’s	injustice	or	to	sublate	it,	but	is	something	given	with	
the	world,	as	the	law	of	its	act	of	donation.	The	world	is	itself	the	supreme	law	
of	justice	–	not	the	world	as	it	is,	but	that the	world	is,	that	it	always	surges	
forth	again,	always	plural	singular.
This	brings	us	back	to	the	issue	of	the	“incommensurable”	to	which	Nancy	
refers in the paragraph Dis-Enclosure	we	quoted	above.	Already	in	The Ex-
perience of Freedom	 (orig.	 1988),	Nancy	offers	 an	 interesting,	 rather	 illu-
minating	 statement	 about	 the	 incommensurable.	 Justice,	 he	writes,	 can	 no	
longer be  that of  a  right  environment presupposing a given measure.12 By 
this	Nancy	refers	to	the	ontological	order	of	an	(ancient)	world	that	gave	a	
central function to the idea of a just measure. Let us give a brief summary in 
order	to	clarify	his	point,	because	it	 is	crucial	in	Nancy’s	understanding	of	
secularization.
The	collapse	of	the	idea	of	a	just	measure	and	environment	refers	implicitly	
to	Aristotle’s	 doctrine	 of	 the	Mean.	 In	 the	Nicomachean Ethics,	Aristotle	
describes  it as  the  task of  the excellent person  to discover  the  right mean 
and to keep the just measure.13 All excellence or virtue lies in the middle of 
two	extremes	and	it	is	necessary	to	keep	mid-way	between	the	too	much	and	
the	too	little	in	order	to	retain	the	middle.	The	right	mean	is	not	an	arbitrary	
choice	of	a	free	individual	but	a	pressing	task.	To	act	virtuously	is	to	act	in	
accordance	with	the	stable	order	of	being:	one	must	do	the	good	in	accord-
ance	with	 the	 good	which	 is	 being.	Keeping	 the	middle	 path	 is	 therefore	
never just an individual matter. As a polis,	citizens	must	strive	together	for	
the	mean	 and	 comply	with	 the	 superior	 structure	 that	 is	 the	 cosmos.	The	
right	mean	and	just	measure	are	never	purely	moral	matters	but	always	ques-
tions of being. Every digression from the right mean  is a detour from the 
unfolding	of	being	and	therefore	always	an	ontological	excess.	The	(right)	
mean	 is	as	 it	were	 the	covenant	of	 finite	beings,	of	 the	closed	cosmos	of	
the	ancient	world.	Or	put	differently,	justice	(dikè) is a question of the right 
modality of being.
Because	Christianity	has	introduced	the	notion	of	infinity,	and	thereby	indi-
rectly	paved	the	way	for	the	infinite	modern	world,	things	changed	substan-
tially.	Christianity	 instituted	a	remarkable	relation	between	finitude	and	in-
10
Jean-Luc	Nancy,	Dis-Enclosure: Deconstruc-
tion of Christianity,	New	York:	Fordham	Uni-
versity	Press,	2007,	p.	8.
11
Jean-Luc	 Nancy,	 Being Singular Plural,	
transl.	Anne	E.	O’Byrne	and	Robert	D.	Rich-
ardson,	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	
2000.
12
Jean-Luc	Nancy,	The Experience of Freedom,	
transl.	 Bridget	 McDonald,	 foreword	 Peter	
Fenves,	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	
1993,	p.	75.
13
In	Aristotle,	The Complete Works of Aristotle,	
Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1999,	
1105b15–1109b25.
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finitude,	between	measure	and	excess.	Insofar	as	creation	is	created,	its	mode	
of	being	is	one	of	finite	dependence,	but	insofar	as	creation	is	the	result	of	a 
Creating	Act	that	comes	into	being	ex nihilo,	its	covenant	is	that	of	incom-
mensurability and infinity. What finite creature measures itself against is the 
universe,	the	All,	 the	infinite	expansion	of	the	universe	that	brought	Pascal	
into such	turmoil.	Nevertheless,	such	a	notion	of	infinity	has	still	maintained	a	
supreme	theological	limit	by	which	every	right	and	wrong	was	finally	judged.	
God	was	not	only	the	maker	of	earthly	things.	God	also	added	a	cosmic	di-
mension	with	his	promise	of	another	kingdom	from	which	wrong	will	be	ban-
ished.	But	with	the	retreat	of	God	in	the	modern	era,	creation	is	thrown	back	
increasingly	on	itself.	Lacking	any	criterion	or	limit	point,	it	becomes	its	own	
measure;	but	this	only	means	that	all	measure,	as	something	limiting	human	
life	from	outside,	is	absent.	Consequently,	measure	is	constituted	by	nothing	
but	excess.	Creation	can	measure	itself	against	nothing	other	than	itself.	One	
can	therefore	no	longer	properly	speak	about	creation:	it	is	now	pure	being	
that	is	its	own	measure.	Precisely	for	this	reason	all	former	measures	do	no	
longer	hold.	Aristotle’s	world	of	right	mean	and	just	measure	is	miles	away	
from here.
2.1. The incommensurable as a modern excess
It	took	six	years	for	Nancy’s	above-mentioned	suggestion	from	The Experi-
ence of Freedom	 to	acquire	more	specificity.	Nancy’s	main	entry	point	 for	
“Human	excess”	(1994)	is	keeping	measure.14	In	this	essay,	Nancy	reflects	
on	a	form	of	excess	or	immeasurability	that	would	be	proper	to	a	modern	and	
thus secularized order.
First	of	all,	Nancy	describes	modern	 time	as	a	period	of	vast	numbers.	Of	
course one does not require nancy in order to make this claim. It is obvious 
that	modern	 time	sustains	 itself	with	enormous	numbers,	 imposing	 records	
and	dizzying	figures.	These	immense	numbers	initially	seem	to	refer	to	a	form	
of immeasurability or excess proper to our time. Everything is going faster 
and	is	expected	to	grow	exponentially,	and	whereas	from	an	optimist	side	we	
are	told	to	be	fascinated	with	this	immeasurability,	from	the	side	of	the	pes-
simists	we	are	warned	for	the	uncanniness	of	it	all.	But	these	alternatives	are	
precisely	what	Nancy	puts	into	question.
Both	positions,	one	can	infer	from	“Human	excess”,	fail	to	make	a	crucial	
step	when	thinking	the	place	of	this	excess	in	modernity.	According	to	Nancy,	
excess	is	found	not	so	much	in	always	larger	and	larger	numbers.	Although	
certain	things	are	immeasurably	large,	we	are	still	able	to	measure	them	and	
put	the	results	into	figures.	One	can,	for	example,	measure	how	many	mil-
lions	of	grains	of	sand	there	are	in	a	handful,	how	many	miles	of	books	there	
are	in	a	shop	rack,	or	how	many	letters	can	be	found	in	the	collected	works	
of	Hegel.	In	our	modern	era,	the	immeasurable	is	always	measurable:	hence	
there is no measure a priori	given	from	which	the	immeasurable	is	said	to	
diverge.	Excess,	therefore,	does	not	lie	in	huge	numbers.	Whether	the	world	
population	is	now	twenty	or	thirty	million	makes	no	difference	to	the	exces-
sive.	There	is	no	fixed	criterion	against	which	we	could	measure	these	twenty	
or	thirty	millions,	and	it	is	precisely	the	lack	of	this	criterion	that	shows	how	
excess	lies	elsewhere.	The	ever-greater	dissemination	of	vast	numbers	in	our	
culture,	such	as	computer	memory	or	the	price	of	a	nuclear	submarine,	indi-
cates	not	so	much	an	aberration	from	certain	established	measures	or	norms,	
but	rather	an	exponential	growth	of	our	responsibility	for	the	world	and	ex-
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istence.	Numbers	that	measure	the	stock	market	or	world	population	point	
to	 a	 certain	 connectedness	 or	 commitment:	 an	 engagement.	 For	 example,	
the	risks	and	consequences	of	the	growing	impact	of	multinationals	on	our	
economy	or	of	the	ever-increasing	world	population	show	an	urgent	respon-
sibility	to	act	without	any	pre-given	criterion.	The	excess	of	these	figures	lies	
not so much in the size and degree of their divergence from some criterion 
but  rather  in  the  responsibility  that  conceals  itself precisely  in  the  lack of 
such a criterion.15
In	a	secularized	era,	the	“humanitas”	of	man	reveals	the	excess	and	the	im-
measurability	as	the	measure	of	all	things;	because	of	this,	man	must	measure	
itself.	This	implies	a	different ontological order,	a	different	status	of	what	is.	
It	is	not	without	significance,	for	Nancy,	that	figures	of	genocide	and	other	
forms  of  extermination  have  become  the  semantemes  or  signifiers  of mo-
dernity.	Six	million	is,	for	example,	inseparably	linked	with	the	six	million	
victims	of	the	Shoah.	This	number,	six	million,	does	not	simply	mean	“a	lot”	
or	an	“immeasurable	amount”.	This	figure	is	in	itself	not	immeasurable	and	
does	 not	 indicate	 that	 a	 specific	 limit	 has	 been	 transgressed.	 Furthermore,	
how	do	we	measure	the	deaths	of	ten	Jews,	or	the	extermination	of	hundreds	
of	thousands	of	Armenians?	Rather	than	a	sort	of	excess,	this	sort	of	figures	
indicates	a	specific	order,	a	proper	register	of	engagement	and	responsibility.	
Extermination	 is	 literally	 an	 exhaustion	 of	 numbers,	 the	 counting	 out	 of	 a	
people to its existence as a totality.
With	this,	Nancy	indicates	the	modern	tendency	to	posit	the	excess	of	num-
bers	of	our	world	population	as	an	absolute	 fact,	 as	 something	 that	exists	
fully	 in	 itself;	 consequently,	he	calls	 for	another	covenant	of	being.	More	
precisely,	excess	is	its	own	proper	covenant.	The	world	is	measuring	itself,	
that	is,	as	excess;	it	forms	the	measure	of	an	unheard	of	measure.	That	the	
world	measures	itself	means	that	it	is	engaged	as	a	whole.	Nancy	gives	the	
example	of	the	Big	Bang	which,	for	him,	is	not	a	matter	of	something	very	
large but of certain greatness (grandeur),	in	the	sense	of	being	its	own	meas-
ure.	There	is	no	measure	against	which	the	being	of	the	Big	Bang	could	be	
measured.
As	stated	above,	the	magnitude	that	is	 its	own	excessive	measure	indicates	
at the same time the criterion for an absolute responsibility. Once one takes 
the	measure	of	the	Big	Bang,	our	responsibility	for	the	universe	is	total	and	
immeasurable.	The	Shoah,	for	example,	is	usually	regarded	as	a	form	of	ex-
cessive	violence;	but	it	no	longer	suffices	to	name	the	correct	measure	from	
which	this	excess	would	diverge.	Responsibility	must	take	on	the	posture	of	
a similar excessiveness.
In	this	way,	human	beings	receive	their	proper	measure	as	an	absolute,	limit-
less	responsibility.	Such	responsibility	has	no	pre-given	measure	that	would	
precede	it,	which	is	also	indicated,	for	example,	by	the	population	explosion.	
The	question	is	not	only	how	many	people	the	Earth	can	sustain;	it	is	also	a	
question	of	which	people,	and	which	existences.	The	grandeur	of	the	number	
turns	simultaneously	into	a	moral	grandeur:	“the	size	[taille] of humanity be-
comes indissociable from its dignity”.16
14
The	 text	 appeared	 originally	 in	 the	 journal	
Epokhè	and	was	later	published	in	J.-L.	Nan-
cy,	Being Singular Plural,	pp.	177–183.
15
Ibid.,	p.	179.
16
Ibid.,	p.	180.
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2.2. Justice
The	problem	Nancy	brings	up	to	us	is	how	justice	is	to	be	thought	from	a	sec-
ularized	world	that	has	become	its	own	measure,	and	is	thus	simultaneously	
without	measure.	This	perspective	leaves	us	open	to	an	engagement	without	
measure,	and	this	constitutes	our	existence.	Here	we	resume	our	opening	the	
question	,	that	of	sense.	We	saw	that	Nancy	claims	that	it	is	no	longer	a	ques-
tion	of	whether	the	world	has	a	meaning	or	makes	sense,	but	that	the	world	is 
meaning,	is	(as)	sense.	In	the	same	way,	the	world	in	which	we	live	no	longer	
has	a	measure,	but	is	measure.	The	new	way	of	being	–	the	different	ontologi-
cal	order	we	discussed	above	–	demands	a	new	covenant.	Furthermore,	the	
world	itself	becomes	that	which	institutes	what	is	just	and	what	is	not.	Justice	
does	not	come	into	the	world	from	outside	–	the	world	lacks	nothing	–	and	is	
not	given	as	a	fixed	measure:	a	secularized	world	has	no	foundation	or	overall	
aim.	The	world	is	itself	the	sharing	and	the	dividing	of	justice	and	injustice	
such	that	justice	is	no	longer	a	matter	of	a	“(theo-	or	socio-)-dicy”	or	dikè. 
Nancy	writes	in	The Sense of the World:
“‘Neither	dikè	nor	dicy’:	this	is	a	call	neither	for	despair	nor	for	hope,	neither	for	a	judgement	
of	this	world	nor	for	a	‘just	world’	–	but	for	justice	in	this	world,	for	justice	rendered	unto	the	
world:	that	is,	for	resistance,	intervention,	compassion,	and	struggle	that	would	be	tireless	and	
oriented	 toward	 the	 incommensurability	of	 the	world,	 the	 incommensurability	of	 the	 totality	
of	the	singular	outline,	without	religious	and	tragic	remuneration,	without	sublation,	and	thus	
without	discourse.”17
Precisely because dikè	and	“-dicy”	have	vanished,	one	needs	a	reflection	on	
justice,	sense	and	world,	if	one	wants	to	think	the	secularization	of	the	world.	
Something	at	the	level	of	existence	itself	has	appeared,	and	could	profoundly	
influence	our	view	on	justice.	In	light	of	this,	“Cosmos	Basileus”	begins	with	
a	 reflection	on	 the	unity	of	 the	world.18 For nancy  this unity or  totality  is 
not	a	whole	but	a	co-existence	that	as	such	is	not	(has	no	substance),	but	that	
comes	into	being	through	the	plural	co-existence	of	singularities.	This	is	why	
justice	 is	 that	which	must	be	 awarded	 to	 every	 existence	 “according	 to	 its	
unique,	singular	creation	in	its	coexistence	with	all	other	creations”.19	This	is	
also	why	Nancy	speaks	of	a	total	responsibility	that,	once	there	is	no	longer	
any	single	“-dicy”	or	dikè to	measure	or	 limit	 it,	precedes	all	 laws.	 In	The 
Experience of Freedom,	Nancy	describes	this	total	responsibility	as	“an	es-
tablished	or	prevailing	‘just	measure’	in	the	name	of	the	incommensurable.”20 
By	this,	Nancy	understands	the	fact	that	our	responsibility	does	not	stem	from	
a	just	measure	or	from	a	self	that	is	responsible	only	for	its	own	legal	obliga-
tions.	Archi-responsibility	precedes	all	measures	and	laws	and	even	exceeds	
every	self.	This	does	not	mean	that	one	has	to	bear,	always	and	for	all	time,	
ontically,	an	unlimited	responsibility,	nor	that	political	or	moral,	juridical	re-
sponsibility	is	to	be	assessed	in	concrete	situations.	This	assessment	is	also	a	
responsibility,	but	once	the	measure	for	it	is	no	longer	given	in	advance	by	a	
“-dicy”	or	dikè,	all	assessment	of	responsibility	already	starts	from	this	archi-
responsibility.
3. The Day of Judgement
Nancy’s	strategy	in	his	discussion	of	secularization	and	justice	does	not	differ	
from	the	way	he	approaches	other	questions.	He	takes	a	number	of	already	
existing	motifs	or	concepts	and	gradually	“unpacks”	them,	so	as	to	introduce 
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them	into	his	own	vocabulary	with	new	meanings	or	changes	in	their	mean-
ing. His presupposition is that these concepts deconstruct themselves.
Now	it	is	particularly	interesting	for	the	theme	of	the	deconstruction	of	Chris-
tianity,	that	in	the	context	Nancy	discusses	justice,	the	motifs	are	frequently	
religious	 in	 their	origin:	 the	day	of	 judgement,	being	summoned	or	put	on	
trial,	the	(second)	coming,	the	absolute	Other.	Similarly	to	his	treatment	of	the	
sense	of	the	world,	Nancy	expands	these	religious	motifs	to	existential	mat-
ters,	to	the	ontological	conditions	of	possibility	of	existence.	These	conditions	
are central to his oeuvre	in	its	entirety.	Nancy’s	emphasis,	in	the	context	of	
justice	as	in	all	the	other	cases,	is	on	the	real	multiplicity	in	which	our	exist-
ence takes place.
Existing,	he	emphasizes,	consists	not	only	in	being	open	but	also	in	being	
responsible.	To	be	responsible	means	that	we	are	always	in	relation	to	some-
thing.	We	are	always	already	thrown	into	existence	and	must	always	be	able	
to	answer	for	our	existence.	In	this	responsibility,	we	are	judged	because	our	
appearance	is	in	the	sharing	that	we	are	with	and	in	respect	to	others.	This	
structure	of	 our	 responsibility	 and	our	 being	 judged	 “simply”	 arises	 from	
the	fact	that	we	are	compearance.21 We appear as com,	and	through	this	we	
are	summoned	by	the	co-existence	that	we	have	to	be.	We	advene	and	such	
an	arrival	is	never	on	its	own,	but	is	always	both	a	sharing	and	a	dividing,	
that	is,	a	shared	and	divided	being	singular	plural.	According	to	Nancy,	we	
are	always	already	exposed	 to	existence,	always	already	summoned.	 I	am	
already	responsible	even	before	I	assume	my	responsibility.	I	must	always	
already	answer	for	my	existence.	This	archi-responsibility	summons	me;	I	
am	exposed	to	it	as	a	result	of	co-existence.	The	day	of	judgement	is	thus	not	
a	final	judgement	but,	as	Nancy	puts	it	in	La Comparution / The Compear-
ance,	conveys	one’s	being	exposed	to	existence	at	every	moment	of	every	
day:
“There	would	thus	no	longer	be	a	court	to	which	we	should	compear.	However,	we	find	oursel-
ves	still	in	judgement.	The	Day	of	Judgment	–	dies	irae,	the	day	of	divine	wrath	–	is	no	longer	
a	day	at	all…	This	day	is	thus	an	instant	always	in	suspense,	always	a	differed	judgment	that	
cannot	be	appealed.	This	judgment	(justly)	reaches	a	verdict	in	the	name	of	the	end.	This	is	not	
an	End	set	up	as	an	Idea	on	the	horizon;	it	is	rather	how	we	approach	our	own	final	horizon	and	
how	we	do	(or	do	not	do)	justice	to	that	horizon.	This	is	a	simple	judgment,	without	appeal;	it	
is	not	subject	to	any	superior	law	(droit)	for	it	proceeds	from	that	which	precedes	law.	Have	we	
done	right	(droit)	by	that	which	still	has	no	right?	Right	by	our	existence	itself	–	or	since	this 
word	is	subject	to	misuse	in	the	singular	–	by	our	existences,	by	their	community?	Before	this	
law	without	law	we	have	never	ceased	to	compear.	In	the	end	we	compear	there	naked.”22
17
J.-L.	Nancy,	The Sense of the World,	p.	148.
18
J.-L.	Nancy,	Being Singular Plural,	p.	185.
19
Ibid.,	p.	187.
20
J.-L.	Nancy,	The Experience of Freedom,	 p.	
75.
21
Jean-Luc	Nancy	and	Jean-Christophe	Bailly,	
“La	Comparution/The	Compearance	from	the	
Existence	of	‘Communism’	to	the	Community	
of	‘Existence’”,	Political Theory	20	(3/1992),	
p.	 372.	 In	 his	 text	 on	 compearance,	 Nancy	
explains	the	semantic	similarities	between	the	
French	‘comparution’	and	its	English	equiva-
lent	‘compearance’,	both	meaning	‘to	appear	
in	 court’:	 “La	 comparution	 refers	 to	 the	 act	
of appearing in court having been summoned. 
‘Summoning’	carries	a	much	stronger	notion	
of  agency  than  the more  disembodied  com-
parution and  lacks  the commonality  implied 
in	the	prefix.	The	Scottish	commonlaw	term	
‘compearance’	 –	 although	 foreign	 to	 most	
English	ears	–	conveys	 the	meaning	exactly	
[…].”	(Ibid.,	p.	371).
22
J.-L.	Nancy	and	 J.-C.	Bailly,	 “La	Comparu-
tion/The	Compearance…”,	p.	372.
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Once	again,	co-existence	is	the	central	point	of	reference.	Here,	too,	Nancy	
begins	from	the	radical	idea	that	we	can	no	longer	think	on	the	basis	of	any	“-
dicy”.	With	respect	to	justice,	this	means	the	bankruptcy	of	the	idea	of	justice	
as	a	final	settling	of	accounts:	the	undoing	of	all	evil	or	injustice	in	an	ultimate	
destination	or	aim.	Such	a	conception	of	justice	is,	moreover,	an	indirect	jus-
tification	of	today’s	evil	and	suffering.	The	ambition	of	such	justice	is	infinite	
in	the	sense	that	its	aim	lies	in	an	order	beyond	every	finite	order,	whether	as	
a transcendent civitas Dei or as the realization of a free society in the future.
In	order	to	avoid	thinking	justice	in	the	sense	of	an	infinite	“-dicy”,	Nancy	
explicitly	conceives	of	it	on	the	basis	of	a	finite	order	of	existence.	What	one,	
in	an	infinite	vision	of	society,	still	regards	as	a	final	judgement	or	ultimate	
destination	 is	 in	Nancy’s	 thought	 reduced	 to	 the	ever-present	and	eternally	
arriving	judgement	within	the	finite	horizon	that	is	our	existence.	Indeed,	not	
only	has	this	infinite	society	become	bankrupt,	but	the	entities	that	formerly	
summoned	us	 and	 functioned	 as	 the	 supreme	 law-giver,	 together	with	 this	
society,	have	likewise	lost	their	social	ground	and	legitimacy.
One	might	say:	to	think	as	an	atheist	would	thus	also	mean	finishing	first	and	
foremost	with	every	ontological	foundation	or	principle	that	justifies	evil.	This	
is	why	Nancy	speaks	of	a	naked	justice	that	no	longer	strives	for	the	teleologi-
cal	sublation	of	all	injustice	in	a	society	yet	to	come.	The	day	of	judgement	
takes	place	within	the	finite	horizon	of	co-existence,	and	is	therefore	always	
a	judgement	without	a	summoning	entity	(be	it	God,	We	or	the	Other).	This	
does	not	mean	that	henceforth	all	criteria	for	justice	lie	in	me,	in	the	sense	of	
stemming from a literally autonomous subject that separates good from evil. 
If	so,	Nancy	would	be	just	another	defender	of	an	accomplished	humanity,	
whereas	it	is	precisely	against	this	position	that	his	critique	is	directed.	Nancy	
grants	theoretical	primacy	not	to	a	law-making	subject	but	to	existence,	to	be-
ing	exposed,	to	our	appearance	to	and	with	others	in	the	world.
Put	differently,	nomos is not the entity that founds the autos	and	its	existence,	
but,	on	the	contrary,	the	law	to	which	every	autos is exposed. Such exposure 
means	being	summoned	and	judged,	hic et nunc.	Or	again:	there	is	no	longer	
any	 theological	 judge	before	whom	we	must	 appear.	Dies irae,	 the	day	of	
judgement,	 is	not	a	day	 that	could	ever	occur	 in	history	but	 is	 the	 tribunal	
of	co-existence	before	which	we	appear	at	every	moment.	Being	exposed	to	
co-existence	 is	 the	 law	without	 law	before	which	we	 continuously	 appear.	
The	law	without	law	is	the	command	literally	to	do	justice	to	the	co-existence	
that	is	ours,	a	criterion	before	all	criteria.23	In	responding	to	it,	in	the	archi-
responsibility	in	which	we	are	always	placed,	we	must	do	justice	to	existence,	
although	 it	 is	 never	 existence	 in	 general	 but	 always	 singular	 existences	 to	
which	one	does	justice	(or	injustice).	It	is	precisely	by	not	reducing	the	law	
without	law	and	co-existence	to	an	ultimate	(infinite)	day	of	judgement	that	
we	do	justice	to	a	secular	existence.	To	live	in	a	secular	world,	means	to	live	
in	a	world	which	is	sense,	a	world	that	has	become	responsible	for	itself	but	
never closes in itself.
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Ignaas Devisch, Kathleen Vandeputte
Smisao, egzistencija i pravda, 
ili, kako živjeti u sekularnom svijetu?
Sažetak
Činjenica da je zapadna modernost obilježena sekulariziranim svijetom, ateističkim svijetom u 
kojem religija više ne vlada javnom sferom, uzima se zdravo za gotovo. Drugim riječima, pre-
obrazbom iz svijeta gdje smisao leži izvan tog svijeta, u svijet gdje je smisao smješten u njemu 
samome. Ako pratimo tijek misli francuskog filozofa Jean-Luc Nancya predstavljen u njegovim 
djelima The	Sense	of	the	World i Dis-Enclosure, moramo poimati svijet ne kao nešto što ima 
smisao u sebi samome, nego kao nešto što jest sâm smisao. Živjeti u sekulariziranom svijetu 
znači živjeti u svijetu koji jest smisao, svijetu koji je postao odgovoran za sebe ali se u sebe ne 
zatvara. Nancy, pritom inspiriran Martinom Heideggerom, tvrdi da u sekulariziranom svijetu 
više nije upitno ima li svijet smisla, nego da svijet jest smisao. Ako danas želimo biti ateisti, 
zaključuje Nancy, više se ne moramo suočiti s pitanjem »Zašto, općenito, nešto jest?«, nego s 
odgovorom »Nešto jest, i to sâmo čini smisao«.
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Sinn, Existenz und Gerechtigkeit, 
oder, Wie leben in der säkularen Welt?
Zusammenfassung
Dass wir es in der westlichen Modernität mit einer säkularisierten Welt zu tun haben, mit einer 
atheistischen Welt, wo die Religion die öffentliche Sphäre nicht mehr beherrscht, wird für allzu 
selbstverständlich gehalten. Mit anderen Worten: Die Transformation von einer Welt, wo der 
Sinn außerhalb dieser Welt liegt, zu einer Welt, wo er innerhalb derselben liegt. Folgen wir dem 
Gedankenlauf, den der französische Philosoph Jean-Luc Nancy in seinen Werken The	Sense	of	
the World und Dis-Enclosure zum Vorschein bringt, dürfen wir die Welt nicht als eine den Sinn 
innehabende auffassen, sondern müssen sie selbst als Sinn betrachten. In einer säkularisierten 
Welt zu leben heißt, in einer Welt zu leben, die selbst der Sinn ist, in einer Welt, die für sich selbst 
verantwortlich geworden ist, sich aber nie in sich verschließt. Nancy, dadurch von Martin Hei-
degger inspiriert, behauptet, in der säkularisierten Welt sei keine Frage mehr, ob die Welt über 
den Sinn verfüge, sondern er beteuert, die Welt sei der Sinn. Wollen wir heute Atheisten sein, 
folgert Nancy, müssen wir uns nicht mehr mit der Frage befassen, „warum es im Allgemeinen 
etwas gibt“, sondern mit der Antwort „es gibt etwas, und dies allein ergibt einen Sinn“.
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Sens, existence et justice, 
ou comment vivre dans un monde sécularisé ?
Résumé
La conviction que la modernité occidentale soit un monde sécularisé, athée, dans lequel la 
religion ne domine plus la sphère publique, n’est qu’une présomption. Autrement dit : une tran-
sformation, à partir d’un monde où le sens réside en dehors de lui, vers un monde où le sens se 
situe en lui-même. Si nous suivons la pensée du philosophe français Jean-Luc Nancy, présentée 
dans ses livres Le Sens du Monde et La déclosion, nous devons penser le monde non pas comme 
ayant un sens en soi, mais comme étant le sens lui-même. Vivre dans un monde laïque signifie 
vivre dans un monde qui est sens, un monde devenu responsable pour soi-même mais qui ne 
s’enferme pas sur soi-même. Nancy, s’inspirant de Martin Heidegger, affirme que, dans un 
monde laïque, il n’est plus question de savoir si le monde a un sens, mais si le monde est sens. 
Pour être athée aujourd’hui, conclut Nancy, nous n’avons plus à faire à la question « pourquoi 
est-il quelque chose en général ? », mais à la réponse « il y a quelque chose, et cela en soi fait 
sens ».
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